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Executive summary
The trade agreements that the European Union has with North African countries – with 
Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia – are often seen as having delivered disappointing results 
since they came into force during the 2000s. The four North African countries have seen insuf-
ficient growth in their exports to the EU, and have undergone only limited diversification. In 
the meantime, the EU’s exports to North Africa have grown quite rapidly.
Economic growth in North Africa has been well short of what is needed to reduce chronic 
under-employment, especially of young people. The EU trade agreements with North Africa 
could generate additional, large benefits if they either directly led to or at least incentivised 
behind-the-border reforms to make the North African countries more competitive in interna-
tional markets. Though this reform is the responsibility of the governments of North African 
countries, the EU could provide stronger incentives to improve the business environment. 
Meanwhile, in agriculture, were the North African countries able to compete with the EU on 
an even playing field, agriculture’s share of domestic value-added would almost certainly be 
significantly larger and rural poverty correspondingly lower than at present.
Nevertheless, the agreements have been judged too harshly. They helped generate 
large amounts of trade, though not enough was done on the domestic front to derive the 
maximum benefit from them. Moreover, the domestic and international environment has 
been unfavourable, impeding North Africa’s progress. Over much of the relevant period, the 
EU grew sluggishly, and North African countries faced sharply increasing competition on Eu-
ropean markets from China and the eastern Europe countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 
after. Generally, countries that acceded to the EU have done much better than the countries 
of North Africa. While the countries of North Africa are not EU candidates, there is much that 
they and the EU can learn from the example of the former accession countries in terms of how 
a new generation of trade agreements between the EU and North Africa could be deeper and 
more comprehensive than currently, and could be accompanied by increased aid for trade.  
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1 The EU-North Africa trade agreements
The trade agreements between the European Union and Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and 
Tunisia, part of a broader effort to integrate the north and south shores of the Mediterrane-
an and the Near East, have disappointed many who believed they could transform North 
Africa. 
The political context clearly has not helped. The vision of the 1995 Barcelona Declara-
tion, signed by EU, North African and other Mediterranean nations was to create an “an 
area of shared prosperity,”1 but two decades on it was acknowledged that this vision had 
not been realised and the Barcelona Declaration could not have predicted the destabilising 
impact on North Africa “of al-Qaeda… and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and 
Iraq; the political immobility and lack of reforms and improvements in governance in many 
Mediterranean Partner Countries…; the instability caused by the Arab Spring since 2011…; 
the migration and refugee crises; or the emergence of Islamic State terrorism”2.
Over the last ten years, growth in the four North African countries3 has been relatively 
slow, volatile and characterised by large current account and fiscal imbalances. Egypt, 
Morocco and Tunisia have seen per-capita income growth of around 1.5 to 2.5 percent since 
2007, while in Algeria it has been around 1 percent, some 2-3 percent slower than average 
of the lower middle income countries. These growth rates are not per se disastrous, but they 
are entirely inadequate to deal with youth unemployment in the four North African coun-
tries, which is among the highest in the world. Nor are they sufficient to raise the very low 
participation of women in the labour force. There has been little convergence with incomes 
in Europe, and the absolute difference in income levels might be increasing, reflecting the 
sharp slowdown in the North African countries since the Arab Spring. In this context, it is 
natural to point to the EU’s trade agreements with these countries as one of the culprits, or 
at least as not having helped.
Though we recognise the importance of the region’s political turbulence in influencing 
these outcomes, our aim is solely to provide an economic assessment of the trade agree-
ments between the EU and North Africa. We argue, in line with previous assessments, that 
the trade agreements are highly imperfect and much can be done to deepen them and 
improve on them in various ways. However, we also argue that the common view of the 
trade agreements is overly negative, for three main reasons: 
• First, there tend to be excessively high expectations of trade agreements, whereas 
domestic conditions and policies are the main driver of economic growth and specifi-
cally of export performance. For the North African countries, domestic conditions and 
reforms had to play an even more significant role in stimulating exports since the coun-
tries faced very low EU tariffs even before the trade agreements were concluded. 
• Second, the welfare benefits of a trade agreement are not adequately measured by the 
improvement in the bilateral trade balance; a much better, though imperfect, measure 
is the increase in total trade between the parties. In the case of the EU and North Africa, 
total trade has increased significantly. 
• Third, some international and domestic developments external to the agreements clear-
ly contributed to the weak performance of North Africa’s exports to Europe. We cannot 
know the counterfactual, but it is possible that without the agreements, North Africa’s 
growth, investment and export performance would have been considerably worse. 
1   The Barcelona Declaration is available at https://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/pdf/policy/barcelona_declaration.pdf.
2   As noted by the European Institute of the Mediterranean; see https://www.iemed.org/actualitat-en/not-
icies/20e-aniversari-del-proces-de-barcelona/.
3   Libya, which does not have a trade agreement with the EU, is excluded.
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The main policy implication of this is unsurprising: more effort should be made to 
improve and deepen the existing trade agreements. More importantly, the North African 
countries need to accelerate domestic reforms. These reforms are needed anyway to boost 
economic growth and employment, irrespective of trade agreements, but reform can also 
work to maximise the benefits from the agreements.
2  The literature takes a dim view of the EU-
North Africa agreements
Although the trade regimes of North African countries continue to be ranked among the 
most protective, they are more liberal than in the past. Trade liberalisation has progressed 
significantly as a result of numerous bilateral and regional agreements, membership of the 
World Trade Organisation and adoption of its disciplines, and instances of autonomous 
trade reforms. For example, in Morocco and Tunisia, Most Favoured Nation (MFN) applied 
tariffs (tariffs that are applied to all World Trade Organisation members) on non-agricultural 
products were cut from about 21 percent in 2006 to about 8 percent in 2017. Even against this 
background, the literature reaches generally negative conclusions when assessing the trade 
performance of North African countries. Several of the studies find that current trade volume 
is well below its potential given the countries’ relative sizes, geographic distances from cen-
tres of demand, common language and colonial links (Cestepe et al, 2015). They also find that 
there is a low degree of intra-regional integration, reflecting non-complementary produc-
tion structures and many non-tariff barriers4. Associated with that fact are low integration in 
global value chains. Studies also find that there is low product and geographic diversification 
of the region’s exports5.  
The EU plays a very prominent role in North Africa’s trade, representing by far the largest 
trading partner of countries in the region, on account of its size, geographic proximity, lin-
guistic and colonial ties, and the existence of large North African diasporas in Europe. North 
African countries have long enjoyed access to European markets under the Generalised 
System of Preferences, and the formal effort to promote closer market integration between the 
EU and North Africa dates as far back as 1969 (Parra et al, 2016), culminating in trade agree-
ments which came into force at different times (Table 1) and which were part of a broader 
effort to integrate Europe with the ‘South’.
4   Non-tariff barriers remain major obstacles to trade within North Africa. Most tariffs in the region have been removed 
under the two major preferential agreements in the region – the Pan Arab Free Trade Area (PAFTA), which came into 
force in 1998 and allowed duty free access to its 17 member countries’ markets, and the Agadir agreement between 
four countries, which came into force in 2007. Nevertheless, red tape, poor logistics, lack of transparency and com-
plicated customs clearance hamper regional trade. For example, the region’s exporters occasionally have to obtain 
special import permits to avail themselves of preferences that should be automatic under trade agreements. North 
Africa also has particularly low logistics quality, while the Middle East has onerous documentation requirements.
5   Using gravity models, which predict countries’ trade flows as a function of their economic size and distance, Ferragi-
na et al (2005) concluded that the volume of trade between the EU and Middle East and North Africa countries could 
be 3.5 to 4 times greater if the two regions were to reach the EU’s level of integration. Other stylised facts gleaned 
from the literature include: Mashreq countries exhibit greater levels of integration both within the area and with 
the rest of the world compared to Maghreb and Gulf countries; EU, Gulf Cooperation Council and Arab Maghreb 
Union (AMU) trading arrangements have not promoted greater integration among member countries (Al-Atrash and 
Yousef, 2000); the trade potential of the Middle East and North Africa region is found to exhibit the greatest degree of 
under-trading, after South-East Asian countries (IMF, 2002); the region is an “underachiever”, especially where trade 
with the EU and with Eastern Europe is concerned (Miniesy, 2004); intra-regional trade within the Middle East and 
North Africa is low relative to that predicted by gravity models and worse than in sub-Saharan Africa.
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Table 1: Trade agreements between the EU and Mediterranean countries
Country Agreement signed Official entry into force1
Tunisia July 1995 Dec 1997
Israel Nov 1995 June 2000
Morocco Feb 1996 Mar 2000
Jordan Nov 1997 May 2002
Egypt June 2001 June 2004
Algeria Apr 2002 Sep 2005
Lebanon June 2002 Apr 2006
Palestine (interim agreement) 2005 2007
Source: Bruegel.
However, while North Africa’s imports from the EU have risen significantly since the signa-
tures of the respective free trade agreements (FTAs), studies employing the gravity model find 
that the effect of the FTAs on North Africa’s exports to the EU has been modest at best (Parra 
et al, 2016). 
Studies attribute the unequal benefits of the bilateral trade agreements to three main factors:
• First, as mentioned, the fact that North African countries already faced low EU tariffs even 
prior to the agreements.
• Second, limited liberalisation of agriculture in the EU, while agriculture is seen as a sector 
that is part of North Africa’s comparative advantage. Studies suggest that regional trade 
agreements that have included agriculture tend to be more advantageous to developing 
countries, and so Middle East and North African countries could have benefited signif-
icantly from inclusion of agriculture in their trade agreements with the EU (Parra et al, 
2016). This shortcoming has been partly corrected with new agreements on agriculture 
with some countries.
• Third, the trade agreements between the EU and North Africa are generally considered 
‘shallow’, ie weak on liberalisation of services, investment and on dealing with non-tariff 
barriers and various ‘behind the border’ impediments to trade. 
Most of these studies, which compare the effect of FTAs on trade with that of arms-length 
relationships, are subject to the critique that FTAs are between parties that trade a lot anyway, 
so attempts to estimate the effects of trade agreements on the volumes of trade are biased 
downward (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007). Freund and Portugal-Perez (2013) aimed to correct 
for this. They used panel data covering 1994-2009 and controlled for country-pair, importer 
and exporter fixed effects. Their results indicated that trade agreements signed between the 
EU and North African countries during that period did not lead to better outcomes according 
to various measures. They concluded that the agreements need to be deeper6.  
6   A common challenge in the empirical gravity literature is the zero-trade problem along with the issue of self-selec-
tion underlined by Parra et al (2016). Helpman et al (2008) were among the first to propose a two-stage estimation 
procedure that incorporates selection into trade in the first stage and trade flow equation in the second stage. 
Hence the model is able to predict zero trade flows among others. However, as Cestepe et al (2015) highlighted, 
researchers have to find an exclusion restriction for the identification of the second equation, and Westerlund and 
Wilhelmsson (2011) proposed an easier to implement fixed effects panel Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimator 
to solve the zero-trade problem. Irrespective of the various econometric challenges encountered in the assessment 
of the EU’s Middle East and North Africa trade agreements, the majority of studies agree that there is potential for 
greater intra-regional cooperation and the full inclusion of agricultural trade in EU-North Africa FTAs.
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Table 2: Moroccan and EU tariffs on goods from the rest of the world, 1993 and 2016
1993 2016
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Food and live 
animals 36.94 36.94 7.34 10.42 23.37 18.17 2.86 7.13
Beverages and 
tobacco 31.03 31.03 15.00 39.63 30.47 9.48 1.05 5.25
Crude materials, 
inedible, except 
fuels 22.88 22.88 0.56 0.98 3.36 0.58 0.15 0.45
Mineral fuels, 
lubricants and 
related materials 24.67 24.67 0.52 0.94 5.60 1.07 0.32 0.40
Animal and vege-
table oils, fats and 
waxes 50.70 50.70 5.90 8.53 6.53 2.47 2.04 4.64
Chemicals and 
related products, 
n.e.s.
45.92 45.92 6.25 7.52 5.64 0.79 1.75 2.90
Manufactured 
goods classified 
chiefly by 
material
62.71 62.71 3.77 6.00 12.16 2.70 1.84 3.04
Machinery 
and transport 
equipment
51.85 51.85 4.65 6.04 9.72 2.11 1.28 2.10
Miscellaneous 
manufactured 
articles
69.59 69.59 3.71 8.56 13.26 4.63 3.45 5.85
Commodities and 
transactions not 
elswhere classif.
55.47 55.47 0.10 0.12 2.50 0.15 0.06 0.07
Source: https://wits.worldbank.org/.
Asymmetric liberalisation
The EU undertook comprehensive trade liberalisation under General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organisation (WTO) rounds from their outset, while liber-
alisation in North Africa was slower. In fact, Algeria is still not a member of the WTO. Egypt 
joined the GATT in 1970, Morocco in 1987 and Tunisia in 1990. Moreover, the EU has granted 
preferential access to North African countries since 1973 under the Generalised System of 
Preferences or other special arrangements. 
For example, in 1993, Morocco’s MFN tariffs were two to ten times higher than the EU’s, 
and Morocco’s effectively-applied tariffs were the same as MFN since there were no bilateral 
trade agreements of note (Table 2). In 1993, the EU tariffs that Morocco faced were near zero 
for manufactured products and around 12 percent for agriculture. By 2016, both the EU and 
Morocco had granted each other tariff-free access for nearly all manufactured products (Table 
3). Notable exceptions include Moroccan imports of food and live animals, for which tariffs 
remain near 12 percent. Morocco has also reduced its MFN applied tariffs dramatically, while 
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the EU has made more moderate reductions. Morocco has also entered into trade agreements 
with the United States, other Arab countries and Turkey, and this is reflected by its effective-
ly-applied tariffs being far lower than its MFN applied tariffs. For manufactured products, 
Morocco’s effectively-applied tariff is at time of writing near zero. 
Table 3: Tariffs applied by Morocco and the EU to each other, 1993 and 2016
1993 2016
Morocco 
effectively 
applied rate on 
the EU
EU effectively 
applied rate on 
Morocco
Morocco 
effectively 
applied rate 
on the EU
EU effectively 
applied rate on 
Morocco
Food and live animals 30.65 13.27 11.98 1.13
Beverages and tobacco 45.08 11.56 6.94 0
Crude materials, 
inedible, except fuels
25.2 0.77 0.26 0
Mineral fuels, lubricants 
and related materials
45.94 1.92 0 0
Animal and vegetable 
oils, fats and waxes
51.05 1.03 1.93 0
Chemicals and related 
products, n.e.s.
45.86 0.01 0.01 0
Manufactured goods 
classified chiefly by 
material
62.77 0.43 0.01 0
Machinery and 
transport equipment
52.28 0.03 0.98 0
Miscellaneous 
manufactured articles
72 0.54 0.01 0
Commodities and 
transactions not 
elswhere classif.
55.97 0.25 0 0
Source: https://wits.worldbank.org/.
As Morocco’s tariffs have been lowered from far higher levels than the EU’s tariffs since the 
1990s, it is hardly surprising that EU exports to Morocco grew faster than Morocco’s exports 
to the EU as the agreements came into force. It is more perhaps surprising that exports from 
Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia to the EU also grew less rapidly than their exports to the 
rest of the world. From 2001-16 EU exports to the four countries expressed in US dollars grew 
at 7.3 percent per year, while EU global exports (including to the North African countries) 
grew at 5.2 percent per year. In this period, exports from the four North African countries to 
the EU grew at only 4.6 percent per year while exports from the four countries to the world 
(including the EU) grew at 6 percent per year7.
As things stand, the four North African countries except Tunisia continue to run large 
non-energy trade deficits with the EU (Figure 1). 
Tunisia’s non-energy trade with the EU was in deficit for many years but, as its domestic 
demand slowed amid political uncertainty, became balanced in 2016, despite a sharp fall in 
Tunisia’s production and export of phosphates. Algeria, whose exports are dominated by oil 
and gas, not surprisingly runs the largest bilateral deficit with the EU, excluding energy.
But are bilateral trade balances the appropriate measure of gains from the trade agreements?
7  Sourced from the World Bank WITS database (https://wits.worldbank.org/). Algeria’s exports of oil and gas grew 
slowly and were affected by world energy market conditions, not its trade agreements. However, even if Algeria is 
excluded, the trade balance outcomes remain disappointing.  
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Figure 1: North African countries, average annual growth in exports to the EU 
(energy included)
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat.
Figure 2: Bilateral trade balance of Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia with the EU, 
1994-2016 (% GDP)
Source: Bruegel based on https://wits.worldbank.org/, Comtrade and WDI. Note: Trade is calculated on the basis of the SITC Revision 3 
nomenclature.
Trade expansion
Well-established theories of tariffs and of the costs and benefits of trade agreements point to 
the expansion of trade between the parties, not bilateral trade balances, as the most impor-
tant single indicator to measure the gains of trade liberalisation. When a small country lowers 
tariffs to zero unilaterally, the price of imports falls by the amount of the tariff, favouring 
consumers and firms that import parts and raw materials for producers. This gain, the largest 
immediate benefit of liberalisation, is measured approximately by the tariff multiplied by the 
volume of imports. The losses associated with unilateral MFN trade liberalisation consist of 
tariff revenue, equal to the tariff multiplied by the initial value of imports, and the decline in 
domestic production of the imported products, measured approximately by the decline in 
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the volume of domestic production of the imported product multiplied by the tariff8. Stand-
ard theory shows that because importing is cheaper than producing at home, the gains to 
consumers are greater than the losses to domestic producers and the loss of tariff revenue. 
The gains from tariff reduction accrue even when the tariff is reduced unilaterally, without 
reciprocation by trading partners.
The gains and losses from a bilateral trade agreement can be calculated in the same way 
as the unilateral MFN elimination of tariffs with two important differences. First, there is the 
additional gain of increased exports in the partner’s market(measured approximately as the 
increase in the volume of exports to the partner multiplied by the tariff as previously applied 
by the partner). Second, there is the cost of granting tariff preferences to the partner where 
the partner is not the most efficient producer of that product, known as trade diversion. This 
is measured approximately as the tariff multiplied by the reduction of imports from third 
parties. 
Thus, the net gains from a bilateral trade agreement will be unambiguously positive if 
there is little or no apparent trade diversion, and the gains are likely to be greater the greater 
the amount of trade generated between the partners. Figure 3 shows that North Africa’s trade 
with the EU grew rapidly in the wake of the agreements, and so did its imports from outside 
the EU, indicating significant trade creation and suggesting no trade diversion. Some North 
African countries, most notably Morocco, have reduced their MFN tariffs in recent years with 
a view to limiting trade diversion. Figure 2 also shows that, while North Africa’s imports from 
the EU grew more rapidly than its exports to the EU, the former grew far less rapidly than 
imports from outside the EU. The effect of the Arab Spring is evident in the sharp deceleration 
and then decline of trade in recent years.   
Figure 3: Trade performance of North African countries: exports, imports and total 
trade with the EU and imports from the rest of the world (excluding the EU), 
1990-2017 ($ billions)
Source: WITS, Comtrade. Note: total trade is calculated in accordance with SITC Revision 3 nomenclature. 
8   For a precise exposition see, for example, Krugman (2008).
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Caveats
The argument that what matters most in affecting welfare is trade creation rather than the 
trade balance – though well-grounded in economic theory – must come with some im-
portant caveats, which are especially relevant in the North African countries. The standard 
analysis implicitly assumes that resources (labour, capital, land) are fully employed and that, 
following trade liberalisation, factors of production move smoothly and quickly from the 
import-competing to the export or to the non-traded sector. However, if there are significant 
costs associated with the reallocation of resources, and especially if there are deterrents, such 
as acute political uncertainty, to investment in exporting sectors and to the upgrading of 
import-competing sectors, one can expect that the export supply response will be less, that 
the reduction in domestic import-competing sectors will be greater, and the costs of adjust-
ment will be higher and that the adjustment will take longer. In that case, unemployment 
might increase and the net benefits from the trade agreement will be significantly reduced 
and could conceivably even be negative. Since North African economies are characterised by 
low employment/population ratios and high unemployment, especially among young people, 
this possibility lies at the core of concerns of North African policymakers about the effects of 
their trade agreements with the EU. These concerns are fully understandable.
It is sometimes argued that widening bilateral trade deficits in North Africa relative to the 
EU simply reflect their higher return of capital as developing countries, and that such capital 
inflows are a beneficial effect of the trade agreements. There is evidence that, in the early 
years after the agreements came into effect, there was a surge of FDI into the region and that 
FDI flows into the region were higher than those into other lower middle income countries 
(Figure 4).   
Figure 4: Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)
Source: WDI. Note: dashed lines represent the FDI share of GDP after agreements between the EU and Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia 
respectively have been signed.  
However, as Figure 4 also shows, the flows of FDI were not sustained, with Morocco a par-
tial exception. All North African countries tend to run sizable government deficits which con-
tribute to current account deficits. Moreover, there is considerable evidence that the return of 
capital in North Africa is not high in comparison to the average of lower middle income coun-
tries. For example, Morocco’s investment/GDP ratio is 31.2 percent compared to 26.4 percent 
in the lower middle income group, but over the last ten years, its per-capita income grew at a 
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rate about 1 percent slower than the lower middle income average. A similar calculation for 
Algeria suggests that the return of capital was even lower than in Morocco. A historical look at 
Tunisia and Egypt suggests that they used capital more effectively than Algeria and Morocco, 
but their domestic savings rates were far lower and both countries exhibited high and difficult 
to sustain global current account deficits, which have led them to resort to the International 
Monetary Fund to finance their balance of payments.     
The risk that trade liberalisation might cause large adjustment costs, protracted unem-
ployment and unsustainable current account deficits can provide valid grounds for pacing 
trade liberalisation, which of course also entails delaying the gains from increased trade. 
However, these obstacles do not negate the arguments in favour of the agreements. Instead, 
they show that the main issues that need to be addressed are the domestic causes of inves-
tor reticence, labour and product market rigidity, and weak competitiveness. As it happens, 
the EU-North Africa agreements did envisage immediate liberalisation by the EU but long 
implementation periods, over a decade or so, for the North African nations. However, their 
domestic reform processes have not yielded the hoped-for results.
Unfavourable investment climate  
An extensive literature has shown that there is no automatic (‘unconditional’) convergence in 
income level between rich and poor countries, even when trade between them is liberalised 
– underscoring the importance of domestic conditions and reform (Sachs et al, 1995; Rodrik, 
2011). In extreme cases, where a country is beset by profound political upheaval and investor 
uncertainty, as during extended periods during the Arab Spring or during the protracted civil 
war in Algeria, it is unlikely that investors in the export sector will take the risk, even if trade lib-
eralisation causes the currency to devalue and provides easier access to imported parts and raw 
materials. Nor, in the event of trade liberalisation, are investors likely to take the risk of upgrad-
ing the import-competing sector to face the influx of competitive products from abroad.
Various measures of progress in domestic reform, such as the World Bank’s Doing Business 
and the World Economic Forum’s Competitiveness Report, suggest that the North African 
countries lag behind not just the EU but also their developing country peer groups, including 
the eastern European former EU accession countries (and now EU members), which have 
provided nearby low-cost labour in competition with North Africa (Figures 5 and 6). Even 
when political conditions have been relatively stable, as in Morocco, uncertainties in other 
parts of the region have often had a contagious effect.
Figure 5: ‘Doing Business’ average distance-to-frontier (DTF) scores
Source: Bruegel based on Doing Business, World Bank. Note: DTF is calculated as an average of DTF (starting a business), DTF (enforcing 
contracts) and DTF (resolving insolvency).  MENA4 stands for Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. 7STEEs stands for the seven small tran-
sition eastern European economies. The term was introduced by the World Bank and refers to Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia.
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Figure 6: Global Competitiveness Index, 2007-17
Source: Bruegel based on World Economic Forum, the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) dataset 2007-17. Note: The GCI investigates 12 
aspects of competitiveness: institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health and primary education, higher education 
and training, goods market efficiency, labour market efficiency, financial market development, technological readiness, market size, 
business sophistication and innovation. The score ranges from 1 to 7 (best). LE10 includes the 10 countries that joined the EU in 2004: 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
It should be noted that the North African country averages shown in Figures 5 and 6 
mask significant differences between Algeria, which is ranked among the lowest-scoring 
countries in the world by both the World Bank’s Doing Business report and the World Eco-
nomic Forum’s Competitiveness Report, and Tunisia, which is ranked near the median. 
Morocco, which is the highest ranked North African country by both organisations (rank 
69-70), is ranked higher than comparable lower middle income countries. Egypt is also 
ranked very low (115-128) relative to its income level.
A difficult international environment  
In addition to domestic impediments, four developments external to the North African 
region and to the agreements have clearly dampened the region’s export performance: 
low growth in the EU, the accession process, China’s rise and the end of the Multifibre 
Arrangement. 
First, following a period of recovery in the wake of the 1991-93 recession, EU growth 
has been on average near 2 percent since 2000, about half the average of the rest of the 
world. In addition, the EU suffered disproportionately and longer from the Global Finan-
cial Crisis. The subsequent euro crisis had a particularly pronounced effect on south-
ern Europe, notably Italy and Spain which are, with France, the main trading partners 
for the North African countries. Even in the pre-crisis years, exports to the EU from the 
Arab countries with EU trade agreements (a broader group than North Africa) increased 
slightly less rapidly than their exports to the rest of the world. Those countries’ total 
exports and total imports also grew less rapidly than the developing country average. 
Slower growth of trade with the EU than with the rest of the world is partly explained by 
the fact that EU aggregate imports from Arab countries grew less rapidly than EU imports 
from the rest of the world. For example, imports into the EU grew by 6.8 percent on aver-
age between 1997 and 2007, while the imports of developing economies grew at a nearly  
9 percent annual rate.
Second, shortly after the bilateral trade agreements between the EU and Algeria, Egypt, 
Morocco and Tunisia were signed in 2002, 2001, 1996 and 1995 respectively, the largest 
EU enlargement happened in 2004, introducing new low-cost competition within the EU’s 
borders .
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Figure 8: EU15 bilateral trade balances with MENA4, the 10 countries of the 2004 
EU enlargement and the rest, 1990-2017 ($ billions)
Source: Bruegel based on https://wits.worldbank.org/, Comtrade. Note: total trade is calculated in accordance with SITC Revision 3 no-
menclature. EU15: pre-2004 EU members. LE10 = 2004 EU enlargement countries: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
Figure 8 shows that the EU15’s trade balance with the 10 central and eastern European 
countries of the 2004 EU enlargement increased following their accession. The trade balance 
of these economies with the EU turned into a small deficit as those countries have adjusted. 
Meanwhile, the EU’s trade balance with the rest of the world fell into a large deficit, which has 
returned to balance in the wake of the financial crisis, as domestic demand slowed, especially 
in southern Europe. 
Figure 9: EU15 bilateral trade balance with the 10 countries of the 2004 enlarge-
ment, with Bulgaria and Romania (2007 enlargement) and Croatia (2013), 1995-
2017 ($ billions)
Source: Bruegel based on WITS, Comtrade. Note: LE Bottom5: the five poorest 2004 enlargement countries (Estonia, Slovakia, Lithuania, 
Latvia and Poland) based on average PPP adjusted GDP per capita (1995-2016 or 1995-2004) reported by WDI. LE Top5: the five richest 
2004 enlargement countries (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Malta, Hungary, Slovenia). Dashed lines represent post-accession trade balances.
Figure 9 shows that all countries that have joined the EU since 2004 have seen a continu-
ing trade deficit with the EU15, with the notable exception of the five countries with average 
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PPP adjusted GDP per capita higher than $23,000 (1995-2016) (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Malta and Slovenia), which had deficits at first, followed by surpluses9.  
Since the North African countries were poorer than the countries that have joined the 
EU since 2004 in the respective periods, it is perhaps not surprising that their trade balances 
followed a pattern similar to those of the poorest new EU members. Moreover, trade com-
plementarity indices10 suggest that Morocco, for example, competes with most of the newer 
EU members, although less so than China and some of the largest East Asian economies. The 
index is not a perfect measure of complementarity because it does not take into an account 
the potential consequences of the distance between the countries and other factors that 
might impact trade flows.
The largest eastern European EU countries – the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary – 
and non-EU eastern European countries with no free trade agreement with the EU – Belarus, 
Moldova and Ukraine – all outpaced their Mediterranean partners in export growth between 
1997 and 2007. The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary’s average export growth was 18 
percent, while for Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine it was 23 percent, versus 12.7 percent for the 
Arab countries with EU trade agreements. The same divergence held for imports from the EU. 
Arab countries’ imports from the EU grew by less than 10 percent between 1997 and 2007, 
while those of the three eastern European EU countries and the three non-EU countries coun-
tries grew by 14.6 percent and 20.1 percent respectively. This divergence occurred despite 
the fact that the Arab countries roughly matched the eastern European groups in aggregate 
growth, which should – all other things being equal – have made them equally attractive to 
the EU as trade partners.
Third, North African countries, along with the rest of the world, have experience a large 
shift in world trade patterns and sharp declines in their export shares as a consequence of 
China’s emergence. From 1992 to 2017, China’s share of world trade increased from about 3 
percent to about 13 percent. This has translated into substantial adjustment costs and has had 
distributional consequences, the effects of which are mostly visible in the industries/firms 
that are highly exposed to foreign competition.  
Fourth, a related external shock was the end of The Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) in 2004. 
The Arrangement had governed the international trade in textiles and clothing11 since 1974, 
setting quotas for each country. Quotas were fairly broad, covering a wide range of products, 
and were specified not in terms of the values but in terms of the physical quantities (Harrigan 
and Barrows, 2009). Figure 10 shows that as quotas were removed progressively, China’s share 
of textile and clothing exports increased almost fivefold from about 7 percent in 1990 to 33 
percent in 2017. China’s share increased massively during the final phase of quota reduc-
tions (Brambilla et al, 2010), but the largest increase in Chinese textile and clothing exports 
took place from 1991 to 1992. At the same time, the share of the four North African countries 
declined only slightly. Still, while North African textile and clothing exports were roughly 
equivalent to a quarter of Chinese exports in 1990, by 2017 North African textile and cloth-
ing exports were equivalent to only about 5 percent of Chinese textile and clothing exports. 
Meanwhile, textiles and clothing shares in the total manufacturing exports of the North Afri-
can countries and China have been declining. 
9  This is in line with the analysis of Papazoglou et al (2006), who attempted to quantify the potential gains of the 2004 
enlargement. Both EU and accession consumers and producers were beneficiaries, but import growth relative to the 
export growth was higher for countries that were initially less integrated with the EU.
10  Trade complementarity index for each individual year can be obtained using the following formula:, where x is the 
value of exports of product k from reporter country i, and X is country i’s total exports. Partner country j’s value of im-
ports of product k is given by m, and its total imports value is denoted by M. A score of 100 points to the ideal trading 
partner. Computation performed at HS 2 digit level by WITS build in tool.
11  Textiles and clothing includes textile fibres, yarn/fabric/articles, and apparel/clothing/accessories, which corre-
spond to 26, 65 and 84 two digit categories of the SITC Revision 3 nomenclature respectively. 
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Figure 10: Selected economies, textile and clothing  exports, shares of total textile 
and clothing exports 
Source: Bruegel based on https://wits.worldbank.org/ and Comtrade.
Slow diversification
Against the background of political uncertainty, weak competitiveness and a challenging 
international environment, the exports of North African countries remained overly concen-
trated on the EU. Within the countries’ exports to the EU, there was relatively little product 
diversification. 
North African exports include substantially fewer product types and are less diversified 
than were those of the 10 countries that joined the EU in 2004. For example, the Herfindahl 
index of concentration suggests that North African export diversification changed little even 
during the pre-crisis period, from 1997 to 2007. 
Algeria has the most concentrated export structure. More than 95 percent of Algerian 
exports to the EU were and are concentrated in petroleum and gas. Growth of exports of oil 
and gas from Algeria to the EU from 1990 to 2016 was on average slower than the growth of 
exports of oil and gas to the EU from the rest of the world. The period from 2008 to 2016 was 
marked by a negative growth rate of gas and petroleum imported by the EU and Algerian 
products were not an exception. These developments reflected trends in the global energy 
markets and were unrelated to the workings of the Algeria-EU trade agreement. 
Similarly, Tunisian exports to the EU are characterised by modest diversification. The 
main export categories are machinery, clothing and petroleum. But while Tunisia has gained 
a market share in the EU imports of machinery, the growth of the share of clothing in Tunisian 
exports to the EU was negative over the whole period from 1990 to 2016. At the same time the 
share of Tunisian petroleum exports to the EU has remained relatively unchanged, while orig-
inally growing faster than the EU imports of petroleum products from the rest of the world. 
Morocco’s exports to the EU are also characterised by modest diversification, which has 
improved in recent years. Morocco mainly exports transport equipment and machinery, fruits 
and vegetables to the EU.  Morocco improved its market share in the EU in the 1990s. From 
2008 to 2016 there were large advances in Morocco’s exports of transport equipment. The 
average growth rate of transport equipment exports was almost 40 percent while the growth 
of total EU imports of transport equipment was slightly negative. There also has been a large 
increase in the share of electrical machinery exported from Morocco to the EU, with the share 
increasing almost fourfold. 
Compared to Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, Egypt’s exports to the EU appear to be more 
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diversified, though the growth of market share of EU imports has been limited or mostly 
negative for some product categories. At the same time, Egypt increased its market share in 
petroleum goods, historically a major export sector for Egypt. In recent years, however, the 
most significant increase occurred in Egyptian exports of electrical machinery to the EU, with 
the growth rate reaching 80 percent.
Weaknesses of the present trade agreements
Given the asymmetric nature of the trade liberalisation required by the agreements, it is 
surprising that the North African countries did not receive more as a quid pro quo for allowing 
the EU unrestricted access to their markets for manufactured products. This could have come 
in four main areas: agriculture, liberal rules of origin, labour mobility and increased assis-
tance and incentives to strengthen competitiveness. In fact, while there was reciprocation in 
each of these areas, commitments made by the EU were less than what could have been ex-
pected. Since the original agreements were concluded, there has been further improvement 
in the agreements in some areas, especially in agriculture with Morocco and Egypt and on the 
rules of origin throughout the region. Financial assistance to Morocco and Tunisia increased 
after the Arab Spring but remains modest in relation to the size of those economies.
Ad valorem tariffs of five to 20 percent typically protect fruits and vegetables in the EU. An 
entry price system for those fruits and vegetables the EU deems particularly ‘sensitive’, such as 
oranges and lemons, provides an even higher degree of protection for those products. Though 
the North African Countries enjoy some preferential access in agriculture, all exporters to the 
EU have to contend with extensive subsidies provided to EU producers. While increasingly 
decoupled from production under recent reforms, there nevertheless help cover overhead costs 
for EU agriculture. According to the OECD, EU support for farmers accounted for 24 percent 
of gross farm receipts and around 50 percent of value added, on average, annually in the late 
2010s. For North Africa, access to the EU is especially important for goods such as fruits, vege-
tables and vegetable oil. The North Africa agricultural sector supports a significant part of GDP 
and an even larger share of employment. For example, in 2016, agriculture accounted for about 
11 percent of value-added in Egypt and 13 percent in Morocco. In addition, it accounted for 25 
percent and 37 percent of employment respectively in these two countries12. 
In both Egypt and Morocco, the deepest poverty occurs in rural areas, implying that the 
restrictions on agricultural trade have much more severe social implications than their export 
or GDP shares might suggest. In addition, barriers to agricultural exports in their most impor-
tant market reduce the ability of North African countries to promote agricultural processing 
industries, which could also help tackle underemployment in rural areas. Were the North 
African countries able to compete with the EU on an even playing field, agriculture’s share of 
domestic value-added would almost certainly be significantly larger and rural poverty corre-
spondingly lower.
Restrictive rules of origin and limited cumulation can restrict North African countries’ 
effective market access to the EU. Until quite recently diagonal cumulation existed across only 
some countries13 and rules of origin (ROO) under the agreements with the EU differed across 
the North African countries. The ROOs for Egypt were not the same as those for Tunisia and 
Morocco, for example. Adherence to specific and complex ROOs placed a burden on exporters 
who might not be familiar with the specific rules and requirements. The Pan-European-Medi-
terranean (PEM) ROO system, introduced progressively since 2010, intended to remedy many 
12  On agriculture, processed agriculture and fisheries the EU has negotiated additions to the original free trade 
agreements with Morocco and Egypt. For these countries, the majority of their agricultural products enter the 
EU duty-free quota free, with only some products subject to special tariff treatment, mostly tariff rate quotas. The 
EU and Morocco signed an agreement on additional liberalisation of trade in agricultural and fisheries products, 
which came into force in 2012. Total trade in agricultural products between the EU and Morocco increased by 187 
percent between 2003 and 2017, rising from €1.3 billion in 2003 to €3.7 billion in 2017.
13  The agreement with Maghreb countries allowed limited cumulation. Diagonal cumulation refers to the use of inputs 
from other member countries towards the value-added target.
16 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚22 | November 2018
of these problems by establishing identical ROOs and full cumulation across the region. How-
ever, integration of value chains across North Africa has been held back by individual country 
challenges, political instability and divisions which have resulted in closed borders, as between 
Algeria and Morocco.
UNCTAD (2004) suggested that the presence of restrictive ROOs might account for the fail-
ure to utilise preferences. For example, between 1996 and 2006, duties were paid on as much 
as 18 percent of Jordan’s exports to the EU that should have been duty-free, possibly because 
of the high costs of obtaining certificates of origin (Ayadi et al, 2009). The ROO in the PEM 
convention are becoming outdated, no longer responding to value chain or customs facilita-
tion realities for several products. Negotiations are ongoing to finalise the modernisation of 
the PEM ROO.  
A major shortcoming of the current EU-North Africa trade agreements relates to the move-
ment of workers. The EU-North Africa agreements essentially reaffirm both parties’ very gen-
eral obligations under the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services, making no commit-
ments on the number of skilled (or unskilled) workers allowed to work temporarily in the EU. 
The agreements with Morocco and Tunisia include commitments on non-discrimination with 
respect to working conditions and social security for their nationals legally working in the EU. 
Those with Algeria contain somewhat more liberal provisions, including limited movement of 
intra-corporate transferees or key personnel within one organisation14.
Increased market access, the improved division of labour and increased competition are 
only some of the ways in which trade agreements can enhance efficiency.  The agreements 
can generate additional, large benefits insofar as they either directly enact or at least incen-
tivise behind-the-border reforms that make the North African countries more competitive in 
international markets.
To be sure, North African countries should be enacting these reforms anyway, regardless 
of trade agreements. But trade agreements can nudge them along, or formally include appro-
priate binding commitments, as they did in the case of the former EU accession countries 
(Box 1). By improving the business environment in North African countries and harmonising 
standards with EU countries, such reforms can engender trade, especially in increasingly 
complex intermediate products in cross-border production networks (Behar and Freund, 
2011). In rough order of importance, such reforms could include: 
• Increased international access to and enhanced domestic competition in services – especially 
backbone services, such as transport, telecommunications, power generation and finance – 
and services that generate large value-added, such as wholesale and retail distribution; 
• More open and predictable foreign investment regimes; 
• Increased competition in government procurement; 
• Judicial reforms that facilitate the creation, operation and closure of businesses; invest-
ments in trade facilitation and the logistics chain; 
• Improved dispute settlement procedures and clearer property rights; 
• Adoption of international standards, especially in sanitation, which would allow the ex-
port of agricultural products; 
• Protection of intellectual property, which many believe can help encourage innovation 
and the import of advanced techniques through FDI.
While the agreements between the EU and North African countries contain general 
expressions of intent in each of these areas, they cannot reach their full potential without new 
binding commitments or stronger incentives to reform.
14  ‘Key personnel’ are defined as persons working in a senior position within an organisation or “persons working 
within an organisation who possess uncommon knowledge essential to the establishment’s service”.
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Box 1: A comparison of the EU agreements with Morocco and with the Czech 
Republic
A comparison of the Czech Republic’s association agreement with the EU, which was 
signed in 1993 and paved the way for the Czech Republic’s EU accession treaty in 2003, to 
the EU-Morocco association agreement, concluded in 2000, reveals significant differences. 
The Czech Republic agreement went further in a number of important areas, from agricul-
tural market access to rules of origin to investment. Of course, initial conditions in the two 
countries were vastly different and Morocco is not on an accession path, whereas the Czech 
Republic was. The comparison is nevertheless instructive because it shows what is possible 
in fashioning deep agreements.
In terms of agriculture, Morocco’s agreement initially covered only a subset of Morocco’s 
potential products and even those were restricted by long lists of qualifications and exemp-
tions. Since the 2000 agreement, new deals have been struck which have lifted many of these 
restrictions and only a few tariff rate quotas and specific conditions now apply. Some of the 
remaining tariff quotas remain unfilled, tomatoes being an exception in 2017.
Similarly, though the rules of origin in both agreements allowed for diagonal cumula-
tion, those in the Moroccan agreement are more onerous and complex and touch on more 
products than those in the Czech agreement. In addition, Czech workers were granted more 
access to the then European Community than Moroccans, including temporary movement (a 
form of services reform) and explicit spousal rights. In contrast, the Moroccan agreement has 
a clause on reducing migratory pressures on the EU. 
Another significant difference is in investment. Both agreements included the intent to 
improve the business environment, but only the Czech Republic agreement required that 
the rights to establish a business be brought into line with European Community standards. 
Furthermore, the Czech Republic commited to legal harmonisation with the EU in customs, 
banking, competition and other laws, while Morocco does not. The Czech accession protocol 
illustrated just how much further regional integration can go and helps explain why the Czech 
Republic, which less than a generation ago was a planned economy, has today trade and 
investment links within the EU which go so much deeper than Morocco’s. 
The accession agreement provided for: incorporation into the EU’s Common Agricultural 
Policy, giving Czech producers subsidies comparable to farmers in existing members and 
making agricultural exports to the EU free but conditioning production by a system of quotas 
or by various reference prices; allocation of structural funds amounting to €26.7 billion (18 
percent of the Czech Republic’s 2010 GDP) over 2007-13; adoption of the EU rule book (acquis 
communautaire) in behind-the-border reforms and more, including the adoption of commu-
nity-wide standards; adoption of the much lower EU common external tariff; formally unre-
stricted access to service producers, though access remains constrained by a host of domestic 
regulations; freedom of investment and general movement of capital; and, last but not least, 
the free movement of people. 
By joining the EU, the Czech Republic also gained representation in the governance 
structure of the EU, and thus has a voice in decisions affecting all members. An important 
question, tackled in section 3, is whether, short of full EU membership, trade agreements with 
Morocco and the other North African countries could be broadened and deepened to reflect 
many of the features of accession agreements.
For example, the EU-Morocco association agreement on intellectual property rights (IPR) 
includes only weak provisions on enforcement; it is based on WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Re-
lated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and does not reflect the higher standards 
set by recent investment protection agreements. Many of the association agreements also 
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have very limited provisions relating to public procurement. The EU-Morocco agreement, for 
example, states only that the parties shall set as their objective a reciprocal and gradual lib-
eralisation of public procurement contracts. Though the association agreements require that 
North African countries’ laws approximate EU standards in areas such as technical rules and 
standards and services, no binding requirement exists. Meanwhile, business surveys reveal that 
international investors view the inadequacy of North African countries’ judicial systems and the 
weakness of their investment codes as a major obstacle. 
Given the highly cartelised nature of important sectors in North Africa, competition policy 
is especially important. But, as in other areas, while some of the EU-North Africa association 
agreements commit partners to introduce competition legislation similar to that of the EU, 
others contain only a very general statement of intent. Under the agreements with Morocco, 
for example, the country commits to ‘import’ EU legislation where it could touch upon trade 
with the EU (Szepesi, 2004). 
Intended in part to remedy these weaknesses, the EU is currently negotiating Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements with Morocco and Tunisia, on which progress has 
been slow for political and technical reasons.
3 Conclusion
This brief review of the EU-North Africa trade agreements points to some fairly evident policy 
conclusions.
The single most important factor determining the region’s growth and stability is what 
the North African countries do themselves. Their domestic reforms will ultimately determine 
regional success or failure. Though changes in market access and trade rules are essential, 
the necessary domestic reforms range much wider. To incentivise these reforms, and to 
gain increased and more predictable access to Arab markets, foster the region’s security and 
therefore its own, reduce the likelihood of large disruptions in oil markets, and avoid periodic 
waves of refugees clamouring for help, the EU must offer concrete things. The assumption 
must be that, if reforms succeed, diversification will follow and trade structures will become 
more complementary. In turn, these will promote regional integration.   
The ideal is to aim for complete free trade between the North African countries and the 
EU, combined with low tariffs on goods from the rest of the world. One possible exception 
will relate to imports of certain agricultural products which enjoy large subsidies in the EU 
and which the North African countries will be allowed to protect with countervailing duties or 
subsidies, to be renegotiated over time as the EU’s agricultural subsidy regime evolves. Even 
though most agricultural support in the EU is decoupled from production, it is nevertheless 
distortive to some degree because it encourages farming that might not occur otherwise.
This also implies that the North African countries should aim to converge towards the EU’s 
low external tariff, thus substantially lowering their average MFN tariffs on goods from the 
rest of the world. Such a process will also provide an incentive to other large trading partners 
to support the transition in various ways, and would also reduce trade diversion. It is possible 
that this process of internal and external liberalisation could result in a de-facto or de-jure cus-
toms union between the EU and the North African countries, similar to that between Turkey 
and the EU, and removing the need for origin certification, even if such a scenario appears 
far-fetched at present.
Further liberalisation of the North African countries’ foreign investment regimes should 
also be part of deeper agreements. This should be done to a degree comparable to that of the 
EU, allowing all comers to enter the services market and other markets, with a limited nega-
tive list. Clearly, barriers to entry into service sectors deter inward FDI in those sectors.
The North African countries should also commit to undertake far-reaching behind-
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the-border reforms. A possible guide to these reforms is the EU rule book (the acquis). The 
reforms required could draw on the experience of the accession countries that subsequently 
became EU members, allowing for longer implementation periods and with wide scope for 
modification to reflect the less advanced capacity and lower incomes in North African coun-
tries. 
In addition to unfettered access to its markets the EU should in return, establish a gen-
erous quota for the temporary movement of skilled workers (known as Mode 4 provision of 
services in the WTO); and also establish a generous quota for several categories of unskilled 
workers (‘service providers’) based on need. 
While the EU’s size, geographic proximity and historical and economic ties to North 
Africa gives it a unique role in the region, the United States also has a security interest in the 
success of the region, as do the Gulf countries, which have a stake in the stability of their Arab 
neighbours. The EU should aim to coordinate efforts to accelerate the development of North 
African countries. Thus, the EU should establish, together with the US and the Gulf countries, 
a mixed loan and grant regional Fund for Trade Facilitation and Competitiveness, which 
would be operated by the World Bank in conjunction with other international institutions and 
major trading partners. The Fund would cover technical assistance and infrastructure invest-
ments, and its scale and operation would take as an example the Structural Funds allocated 
by the EU to accession countries. These funds amounted to €178 billion, about 19 percent of 
the aggregate 2010 GDP of the countries that joined the EU in 2004. The Fund would provide 
grants and loans and would work to leverage them with private sector investments, including 
via International Finance Corporation and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment vehicles.
The Fund would pay special attention to investment in backbone services critical to trade 
such as transport, telecommunications and finance, which are also critical to economy-wide 
productivity. It would seek to promote a programme of domestic reforms in collaboration 
with the African Development Bank, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
designed to reduce behind-the-border barriers to trade and to increase competition in 
domestic markets – including by increasing the transparency and contestability of govern-
ment procurement. These reforms would pay special attention to improving the working of 
customs and standard-setting bodies. The Fund’s assistance would be conditional on prudent 
macroeconomic management, the operation of democracy and respect for human rights.
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